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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT
REGULATION AND COMPETITION
CHARLES CUTLER*
There has been, and is, a battle of remarkable proportions being
waged in the field of computer-related communications. Essentially,
the protagonists are: the telephone industry, new "specialized" com-
munications common carriers, independent equipment manufacturers,
and major users of communications. This is merely an outline of the
complex controversy.
The established telephone industry offers increasingly sophisticated
transmission services, "smart" terminal equipment, and unique combina-
tions of equipment and service. Its services are supported by the highly
respected research and development organizations, Bell Laboratories.
The Bell System offers unified, nationwide end-to-end service. If some-
thing goes wrong, it provides competent maintenance and service people
to fix it. Even the telephone industry's harshest critics admit that we
have the best telephone system in the world. Who could want more?
Many large, sophisticated users of communications say they need
something more. They argue that when Bell became the best, it slowed
down. It has unamortized investment in older equipment and does not
offer consumers the use of technological advances which Bell Labs has
developed. Critics note that private industry has turned to independent
sources because Bell could not or would not offer "state of the art"
service. And, of course, independent equipment manufacturers
wanted to enter the market.
Thus, in the past decade, there has been a major push for "com-
petition." It was argued that "specialized" carriers in the private line
* Member of the firm of Kirkland, Ellis & Rowe, Washington, D.C.; officer
and director of the Computer Law Association.
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field would force Bell to maintain quality service. The need for
competition has been forcefully urged with respect to terminal equip-
ment also. In the past six or seven years, therefore, the FCC has
decreed that transmission service in the private line field (as dis-
tinguished from message telephone service) shall be subject to open-
entry competition. The usual showing by each aspiring entrant that
there is economic justification for his entry need not be made.' As
a result, Bell is now competing with MCI Telecommunications Cor-
poration, Southern Pacific Communications, and others. The principle
that others can duplicate the routes and services of the Bell System,
however, came about only after years of litigation and the fight is
not over; it has been shifted to Congress.'
As to terminal equipment, the FCC has decreed that users may con-
nect any type of terminal equipment to the end of telephone net-
work lines as long as the equipment meets certain minimal technical
standards.' The general test is whether the connection is privately
beneficial but not publicly detrimental, i.e., detrimental to the public
telephone network." Implementation of these interconnection prin-
ciples rests upon the FCC's declaration that it, rather than state regu-
latory commissions, will decide what the nation's "interconnection"
policy shall be, even though a major portion of the traffic is intrastateY
1. Establishment of Policies & Procedures for Consideration of Application to Pro-
vide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point Micro-
wave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43 & 61 of the Commission's
Rules, 29 F.C.C.2d 870, 921-27 (1971), reconsideration denied, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106
(1971), ajI'd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975) (First Report & Order, Docket No. 18920)
[hereinafter cited as Specialized Common Carrier Decision].
2. The telephone industry-sponsored Consumer Communications Reform Act,
H.R. 8, S. 530, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). This bill is discussed by Marks & Bell,
Computer Communications: Government Regulation, 1977 WAsH. U.L.Q. 479.
3. Proposals for New or Revised Classes of Interstate & Foreign Message Toll
Telephone Service (MTS) & Wide Area Telephone Service (VATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593
(1975) (First Report & Order, Docket No. 19528), amended, 58 F.C.C.2d 736 (1976)
(Second Report & Order, Docket No. 19528), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Utils.
Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977).
4. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
5. Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974) (Memorandum Decision &
Order, Docket No. 19808), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC,
537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
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Although the courts upheld the FCC in this preemption of interconnec-
tion jurisdiction, 6 the telephone industry and state regulatory commis-
sions have also taken this issue to Congress.7
This policy of competition is presumably beneficial to users because
rates will decrease, and service will be better; diversity will bring
optimum results. In fact, however, the newly authorized specialized
carriers, in a battle for survival, expended a major part of their efforts
before the FCC urging increases in telephone rates and have been fairly
successful. When Bell finally offered a data service--data-phone
digital service (DDS)-that employed the unused portion of the radio
spectrum of voice circuits, the independent data communications equip-
ment manufacturers and a specialized carrier opposed it, and succeeded
in forcing an AT&T rate increase.8 When Bell offered its sophisticated
66smart terminal" Dataspeed 40/4, independent computer manufacturers
succeeded, initially, in preventing it from being marketed." That
ruling was later reversed by the Commission itselflq-but the issue is
now in the courts."
The battles have swirled before the Commission, in the hearing
rooms, in the courts, and now are in the halls of Congress. Funda-
mental questions remain: To what extent do we need a unified,
6. 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
7. Consumer Communications Reform Act, H.R. 8, S. 530, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977).
8. AT&T (DDS), 62 F.C.C.2d 774 (1977) (Final Decision & Order, Docket No.
20288). The Commission concluded that AT&T had understated its costs for DDS and
therefore held, as the specialized carrier DATRAN and the equipment manufacturers
had urged, that the original DDS rates were unreasonably low and anticompetitive.
9. Ruling of Chief, Common Carrier Bureau, Mimeo 61760 (March 3, 1976) (un-
published). The Bureau Chief held that the Dataspetd 40/4 terminal was essentially
used for data processing functions rather than communications. Because the FCC does
not regulate data processing, it will not accept filed "tariffs" covering activities which
are primarily data processing. This ruling, if upheld, would have effectively barred
AT&T from the market because a consent decree restricts AT&T to rendering com-
munications services subject to public regulation. United States v. Western Electric
Co., [1956] Trade Cas. 71,134 (D.N.J. 1956).
10. AT&T. 62 F.C.C.2d 21 (Memorandum Opinion & Order, Transmittal No.
12449), appeal docketed, No. 77-4005 (2d Cir. Jan. 4, 1977). The full Commission
reversed the Bureau Chief, holding that the service rendered pursuant to the Dataspeed
40/4 offering was essentially communications, not data processing.
11. IBM, The Computer and Business Equipment Manufacturers Ass'n (CBEMA),
and AT&T have sought review of the FCC's Dataspeed 40/4 ruling in the Second Cir-
cuit. Id.
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single supplier of communications, providing end-to-end service? Should
public policy favor nationwide averaged rates throughout the country,
even in rural areas where unit costs are clearly higher? The FCC has
allowed competition in the private line field,"2 but has endeavored to
preserve the monopoly of the established telephone industry in public
message toll service. 3
Another major question remains in the transmission field where
there is competition in offering private line services. What are the
rules of the game? Can the newcomers survive against the Bell
System? Will Bell be permitted to compete, or will it have its rates
forced up by the FCC-in the form of umbrella pricing-to protect the
newborn competitive "infants" which the Commission sponsored? This
issue remains unresolved despite the FCC's attempt to establish pricing
principles for AT&T in the Private Line Rate Case.14
As to terminal equipment, it is now accepted, even in North
Carolina, 5 that telephone users can attach their own terminal equip-
12. Specialized Common Carrier Decision, supra note 1. The Commission said:
"Where services may be in direct competition, departure from uniform nationwide
pricing practices may be in order . . . ." Id. at 915. The Commission also concluded:
inhere is a public need and demand for the proposed facilities and services
and for new and diverse sources of supply, competition in the specialized com-
munications field is reasonably feasible, there are grounds for a reasonable
expectation that new entry will have some beneficial effects, and there is no
reason to anticipate that new entry would have any adverse impact on service
to the public by existing carriers such as to outweigh the considerations sup-
porting new entry. We further find and conclude that a general policy in favor
of the entry of new carriers in the specialized communications field would
serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
Id. at 920.
13. MCI Telecommunications Corp. (Execunet Decision), (Docket No. 20640), 60
F.C.C.2d 25 (1976), rev'd on procedural grounds, No. 75-1635 (D.C. Cir. July 28,
1977). In Execunet, the Commission reaffirmed its policy regarding the role of special-
ized common carriers in domestic communications stated in Specialized Common
Carrier Decision, supra note 1. 60 F.C.C.2d at 35-36. The Specialized Common
Carrier decision clearly allowed competition only in private line services. See 29
F.C.C.2d at 911-14.
14. AT&T 61 F.C.C.2d 587 (1976) (Memorandum Opinion & Order Docket No.
18128). This complex and lengthy decision, rendered after some 15 years of litigation
on rate-making principles, rejected AT&T's contention that it should be permitted to base
its rates for private line services on its long run incremental costs (LRIC) rather than
fully distributed costs (FDC). The Commission also enunciated guidelines which AT&T
must follow if it seeks to reduce rates to meet competition, i.e. the "competitive neces-
sity" test.
15. In the early 1970s, several state regulatory commissions, including North
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/15
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ment to telephone equipment if they have connecting arrangements or
registered equipment. This principle, however, could be overturned
de facto if the following question is answered the wrong way: Who
is going to decide interconnection policies and practices? The Federal
Communications Commission, or the 50 states? The Commission,
supported by the courts, has said it will determine the policies.' 6
However, there is a proposal in Congress to reverse the Commission.
If state regulation is permitted, the North Carolina Utilities Commission
could again propose a rule that only telephone company equipment
can be attached to telephone lines.
Finally, where will the FCC draw the line between the regulation of
communications, on the one hand, and data processing, on the other?
As indicated earlier, 17 the FCC has come close to abandoning at-
tempts to draw the line. In the supplemental notice of its new
computer inquiry (Docket 20828),18 it said, in effect, "Let us know
if the distinction between data processing and communications is so
vague, that it is no longer a useful regulatory tool." If the Commission
concludes that the distinction can no longer be maintained, it may de-
cide to eschew regulation of all terminal equipment, leaving pricing
policies to the mercy of the market and antitrust laws.
The FCC has made an admirable effort to provide regulatory guid-
ance in the expanding field of computer communications, but the only
certainty is that the contest among the contending factions will continue.
Carolina, "planned to forbid inter-connection of non-carrier supplied terminal equipment
with local exchanges, except where such equipment was used exclusively for interstate
communication." North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036, 1043 (4th
Cir. 1977).
16. Telerent Leasing Corp., 45 F.C.C.2d 204 (1974) (Memorandum Decision &
Order, Docket No. 19808), a!?d sub na. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n. v. FCC,
537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
17. See Marks & Bell, supra note 2.
18. 42 Fed. Reg. 13029 (1977). Commission's Rules and Regulations, Docket
20828, Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Enlargement of Proposed Rulemaking,
F.C.C. 77-151 (March 1, 1977).
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